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ABSTRACT
This paper closely scrutinises NATO engagement, particularly the
The Eastern Flank countries in the Middle East. Our main
argument is that the quantitative approach to free riding is useful
only when it comes to black-and-white policy choices and either-
or policy decisions. Simultaneously, it fails when we are faced
with more complex situations in which evaluations go beyond
the very simple numerical markers, such as the 2% threshold of
defence spending. By bringing together a unique regional focus
(the European East and the Middle East), theoretical dilemmas
(free-riding) and policy issues (NATO’s multilateral framework of
co-operation understood in terms of strategic interests and
practical engagement), we are able to show that Romania is a
subtle free rider, which cannot be verified by merely looking at
numbers alone, but can be ascertained by a careful qualitative
analysis which reveals a discrepancy between the country’s
strategic interests and its level of engagement.
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Introduction
The discussion of whether NATO should or should not increase its activity in the Middle
East (ME) involves all its members, which together must approve every step by consensus
in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Nonetheless, consensual decision-making in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereafter NATO or the Alliance) is not the only
reason for the importance of individual members’ attitudes in this area. It is also an excel-
lent field for making observations concerning the free-riding phenomenon.
During the Cold War (CW), NATO served as a military alliance oriented almost
exclusively towards the Soviet Union. After the end of the CW, the Alliance began the
process of redefining its purpose in order to become globally relevant in the new multi-
lateral world. It shifted from being a military alliance to a more political institution and
started to focus on other geographic regions. A watershed moment for NATO members
on the Middle East was the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. These attacks were
the first and only time in the history of the Alliance when Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty was triggered. Following the attacks, in 2002 then-NATO Secretary General
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Lord Robertson1 indicated six reasons why the Mediterranean direction was important to
NATO. In a nutshell, they are: the potential for instability, terrorism, co-operation
between Arab and Western states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
energy security, and economic disparity leading to migration.
In recent years the Middle East has continued to be a geopolitically important theatre
and to attract the attention of global powers, such as the United States (US), but also
Russia and China. It constitutes a similarly significant area for Europe, as a source of
numerous threats on the one hand, and opportunities on the other. However, the European
countries still fumble for an effective way to engage in the region. NATO, which serves as a
key platform for transatlantic security co-operation, represents one of the possible frame-
works through which European states could become more engaged in the Middle East.
While NATO itself has so far been relatively restrained from extensive involvement in
Middle East affairs, lately there has been pressure from the US administration to take on
more responsibility in the region. This US request has broadened the scope of the
burden-sharing debate, which traditionally revolved around defence expenditure.
Nonetheless, it would be naïve to assume that all the NATO members have an equal
interest in that area; the perspective of the Eastern flank is particularly interesting in this
regard. Since the Middle East is not the main area of strategic interests of the Central and
Eastern European (CEE) states, and due to their limited capabilities and resources, it can
be easily presumed that they would not launch substantial independent initiatives in the
Middle East region. NATO’s multilateral framework, therefore, provides a suitable tool
through which they can pursue their interests in the Middle East. Simultaneously, it
opens free riding opportunities for those members who are interested in reaping the
benefits of the Alliance’s umbrella without making a proportionate contribution.
We have read with interest the response2 to our earlier article on the free-riding dilemma
among the “new”NATOmembers,3whereDvorak andPernica present their argument from
the microeconomic point of view. While there is no fault in their reasoning and the micro-
economic indicators definitely provide an interesting insight into the otherwise simplistic
criterion of the 2% GDP threshold, we would like to take the analysis of the free-riding of
the “new” NATO members one step further. In this paper we claim that states might free
ride not only in terms of contributing to the common budget, as usually portrayed, but
also by using NATO initiatives to advance their interests in a disproportionate manner to
their engagement. Such a phenomenon cannot be analysed on the basis of economic data
and rather requires thoroughqualitative analysis of strategic interests and political decisions.
In this regard, Koivula notices that a new emphasis on NATO out-of-area operations,
crisis management, and broader conceptions of security signify a widening agenda of
burden-sharing and therefore, simultaneously, a widening window for free-riding oppor-
tunities.4 For this reason, this paper places NATO’s engagement in the Middle East under
close scrutiny particularly with regard to the Eastern Flank countries. Our main claim is
that Romania is a subtle free rider in the context of NATO’s engagement in the ME – a
fact that cannot be verified by merely looking at numbers alone, but that can be ascer-
tained by a careful qualitative analysis. By doing so we wish to not only engage with
the response paper by Dvorak and Pernica, but also advance the discussion and bring
together a unique regional focus (the European East and the Middle East), theoretical
dilemmas (free riding) and policy issues (NATO’s multilateral framework of co-oper-
ation understood in terms of strategic interests and practical engagement). To this
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end, after providing an overview of our theoretical framework and methodology, we con-
ceptualise and operationalise variables which enable us to proceed with a careful case
study analysis. The conclusions show that the face value, numerical indicators might
be misleading in a complex policy setting that goes beyond simple dichotomies,
whereas a qualitative approach might lead to a surprising appraisal.
Ambiguity in NATO policy towards the Middle East
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation might seem at first glance to be a united body
which takes all its decisions by consensus and implements them unequivocally.
However, the fact that NATO now consists of thirty member states makes its decision-
making process much more difficult. The tensions among NATO’s members emerging
from diverse national interests can in many cases be observed along geographic divisions,
the most significant being Transatlantic, between the United States and the rest of the Alli-
ance. These tensions have a direct impact on NATO policies and strategies, including the
policy towards the Middle East region. Saidy5 confirms that the traditional transatlantic
tensions do not exclude the Middle Eastern decision-making processes. According to
Orfy,6 NATO is often perceived in theMiddle East only as a tool of US policy. Nevertheless,
he claims that the European allies are not willing to be pushed to actions that are opposed
to their interests. Orfy also assumes that both sides within NATO understand they are not
able to pursue their interests in the Middle East without each other.
In this relation, the US brings its international status and military power, while the
European states contribute with soft power and give more credibility to common initiat-
ives. These tensions among member states have been present since the very beginning of
NATO’s Middle Eastern initiatives, as in the case of disagreement over the establishment
of the Mediterranean Dialogue in the 1990s. For this reason, NATO has taken a rather
ambiguous approach in order to reflect the multitude of its member states’ goals and
interests in the region. However, the lack of clear strategy towards the Middle East is cri-
ticised by several authors,7 as well as by experts and professionals.8 Chivvis9 agrees that
the differences amongst NATOmembers cause a lack of clear strategy, and that members
are more connected by facing common threats than by sharing strategic interests in the
Middle East. These differences explain why the Alliance is not able to agree on a common
approach towards the Middle East and its activities in the region consist only of what
Saidy10 refers to as a “shopping list” of individual initiatives.
The creation of the Southern Hub in 2017 could have been an opportunity to unify the
approach of the Alliance, but according to Samaan’s interviews,11 it has contrarily
amplified the differences. Thus, to date, NATO’s ME strategy is based on the lowest
common denominator and left intentionally vague in order to satisfy all the actors in
the decision-making process. The question of what would be required to reach this sat-
isfaction is unfortunately beyond the scope of our discussion.
The different approaches to NATO’s role in the Middle East
Mearsheimer12 defines international institutions as sets of rules which regulate co-oper-
ation among states. The states create these rules and consequently agree to abide by them.
This supports the realist understanding of institutions as a reflection of states’
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calculations based on their self-interests. Nafaa13 then categorises actors within an organ-
isation into two levels: the secretariat, in other words the institutional level, and the inter-
governmental level of member states. These categories of analysis can also be applied to
the literature analysing NATO policy on the Middle East, based on which type of actors it
focuses on. A vast body of literature explores the institutional level,14 which Smith15 in
the case of NATO, further differentiates between military and civilian actors.
Samaan16 reveals internal tensions amongst NATO military and civilian structures and
their struggle to create unified strategy towards the Middle East.
At the same time, Orfy17 points out that the research on the preferences of individual
member states regarding NATO ME policy is still insufficient. The analysis that has
been carried out at this level so far is either from the perspective of Middle East partner
governments or examines the interests, goals and attitudes of only a few countries in the
Alliance. The research pays most attention to the United States, due to its importance
and activity in the region,18 which supports the realist premise that the balance of
power projects into the behaviour of the organisation. Besides the US, the literature also
often focuses on the countries which are most affected by the situation in the Middle
East, namely the Southern flank of NATO, consisting of Turkey19 and other NATO
members in the Mediterranean basin.20 Notably, NATO members that are not the US
or part of the Southern flank have been almost entirely excluded from the research. In par-
ticular, this is true for the countries of the NATO Eastern flank. These are the states situated
in Central and Eastern Europe that, for geopolitical and historical reasons, consider Russia
as their main security concern and point of reference. It could therefore be plausibly
assumed, especially if the realist approach to international institutions is adopted, that
most if not all the CEE states will be free riders on NATO ME policy. However, while
the CEE countries might not be as directly affected by developments in the Middle East
as their southern neighbours, their attitudes on the matter are equally important by
virtue of the consensual decision-making process in NATO. They have the same opportu-
nity to participate in policy-making regarding the Middle East as any other member state.
One might also assume that since the ME is the not the primary focus area of the Eastern
flank, these countries would not play a very active role in determining policy and would not
take part in NATO initiatives in the region. Yet, CEE countries do participate in NATO
partnerships in the region and all of them have deployed military personnel to the
NATO Mission Iraq, even though the Alliance does not oblige them to do so.
It is clear then, that NATO’s engagement in the Middle East is not a simple either-or
situation for NATO’s Eastern members that is clear-cut and self-evident and thus lends
itself to a purely quantitative analysis. As mentioned above, members’ engagement in the
Middle East might not be solely threat-based, but individual countries might pursue
opportunities there, especially in the economic area. Therefore, based on the realist
understanding of state behaviour in international organisations, for the CEE states
NATO might provide an important platform of communication and engagement with
Middle Eastern governments in pursuit of their national interests.
Methodology
Gerring21 defines a case study as “an intensive study of a single case for the purpose of
understanding a larger class of cases.” In political science the cases may vary from the
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level of nation-states, across political parties to particular leaders, however, the state level
of analysis is still the most common.22 Depending on the number of examined units (N)
the research design might vary from a single case, across small-N, intermediate-N to
large-N analysis. The small-N approach offers particular benefits and drawbacks. The
small number of cases allows more space for the researcher to get familiar with each
case and to carry out more focused and in-depth analysis.23 Specifically, single-case
studies are more intensive (i.e. have a lower level of abstraction) and less extensive
(i.e. only one case is examined). Because it is possible to focus on the particular fea-
tures of the problem at hand while at the same time relating those features to
broader sets of research questions in the field, single-case studies can be used to
draw inferences about significant research questions. This is most suitable for the cre-
ation of new data sets on yet unexplored phenomena, such as the question of CEE
states free-riding on NATO’s engagement in the Middle East. New hypotheses might
be generated as a result of the research; thus, an inductive approach is relevant.24
On the other hand, a low level of generalisability is considered the main weakness
of the small-N case study. This follows the rationale that an observation gained
from a small sample size cannot be applied globally. However, this study does not
have the ambition to broadly generalise its results.
Case study selection
When crafting a small-N case study, the selection of the cases should be considered a
cornerstone in the process.25 The selection can be guided by the research question and/
or preliminary hypothesis.26 Another important determinant of the quality of a case
study, following the process of case selection, is an abundance of possible variables.
For this reason, small-N studies usually depend on the proclamation or assumption
of ceteris paribus, that is, that all of the unresearched variables are considered as
holding constant across the sample.27 Therefore, a reduction must be carried out not
only in the number of cases but also in the number of possible variables. These vari-
ables are often very abstract so that the reduction must be executed in a manner that
does not prematurely close doors to alternative explanations of the problem.28 A
careful operationalisation of variables and consideration of any contextual variables
are essential in solving the problem of excessive abstraction.29 The benefit of using
the small-N case study design is that these vague concepts can be operationalised
more fittingly to the specific cases.30
There are many different states that could be selected for this research as there are
numerous and varied states in the Eastern flank. The Central European region that is pol-
itically connected by the Visegrad Group includes the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, and Poland. The Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are another
sub-region belongs in the Eastern flank. Finally, there is the area neighbouring the
Black Sea, where Romania and Bulgaria stand as members of the Alliance. While the
Baltic states might perhaps be more obvious candidates for being free riders, and the
Central European countries are less conspicuous but still potential exemplars, in order
to show that qualitative analysis can pick up on subtleties of political behaviour, we
propose to examine Romania. Due to its proximity and long historic ties with the
Middle East, it would appear on paper that Romania is not a likely free rider, since it
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checks all the numerical boxes. Nonetheless, careful conceptualisation and operationali-
sation of variables will allow us to look beyond the numbers.
Our case study analysis has three main parts. The first introduces the country, its basic
characteristics, decision-making actors and relevant strategic documents. In the second
part, these documents serve as the primary evidence to identify the general strategic
interests of the country, which are then examined to determine its more specific interests
in the Middle East. The last part the case study focuses on the analysis of Romania’s prac-
tical engagement in NATO’s ME initiatives, which may take form of either military invol-
vement or partnership co-operation.
Conceptualisation and operationalisation of variables
The variables analysed in this study emerge from the main research question, how do
states engage in NATO’s ME initiatives in order to support their strategic interests?
The first selected variable deals with the strategic interests of the country in the
Middle East and the second its practical engagement in the region. Taking a realist
approach, the country’s behaviour within an international organisation is presumed to
be interest-driven.31 Therefore, the strategic interest of Romania in the Middle East is
the first observed variable. However, interests become irrelevant if the country is not
willing or does not have the necessary capabilities to act on them. This aspect is then
reflected in the second variable, which is the level of engagement in NATO initiatives
in the Middle East.
Strategic interest
The term “national interest” plays a key role in the realist understanding of foreign policy
decision making, as it is considered a main driver of state behaviour in international
relations.32 However, if not defined properly, the concept of interest could be used
quite ambiguously in political science and international relations. In this analysis, stra-
tegic interests are understood as rather specific objectives which serve the broader
national interest, i.e. the raison d’état, by maintaining or increasing the power of the
state.33 Strategic interests are less abstract than the raison d’état, which serves as a
guiding principle. Both specific strategic interests and the broader national interest are
in most cases articulated in national strategic documents, such as official defence and/
or security strategies. Depending on the particular country the terminology may differ,
but this two-level differentiation of interests is consistent. The concept of strategic inter-
ests can also be referred to as strategic objectives, priorities, or otherwise. While the
raison d’état is usually similar across nations, strategic interests are more diverse as
they are created based on the specific needs of each state. The decision-makers then
use them, or rather, are supposed to use them, as a guide when designing new policies.
Given our topic, this analysis focuses on those strategic interests that are related to the
Middle East region. During the research, these two principal questions are asked: 1)
What are the country’s specific strategic interests regarding the Middle East? 2) How
strong are these interests in comparison to other countries? The interests in the
Middle East can subsequently be categorised on a scale from weak strategic interests
to strong strategic interests.
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Level of engagement
The actual level of engagement in NATO initiatives in the Middle East might offer
another insight into the perspectives of individual Eastern flank countries. Engagement
is understood as a form of participation in NATO initiatives, which reflects the ability of
the country to make policy decisions and subsequently implement them.34 The premise
for analysing this variable is that proclaimed strategic interests are irrelevant unless the
country is willing to act on them practically. The analysis focuses on current NATO
initiatives in the Middle East, as of the end of 2019. In line with these initiatives, the
work is divided into two parts, while none of them is considered superior to the other.
The first one regards military engagement in the region, in this case within the NATO
Mission Iraq. In this regard, numbers and types of troop contributions are compared.
The second part focuses on engagement within existing NATO partnerships, the Medi-
terranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative (ICI). The research
looks into whether the country uses these partnerships and if yes, how and to what
extent. Qualitative analysis of military and partnership participation, indicating the
general level of engagement in NATO ME initiatives, enables us to rank the country
on a scale from low to high.
Case study analysis
Romania can be considered a middle-sized European country, with a population of
almost 20 million and an area of 238,397 square kilometres. In the context of NATO’s
Eastern flank, it is the second largest and most populated country after Poland. The coun-
try’s location plays a particularly important role in Romanian decision-making.
Together, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria are the only three NATO members in the cru-
cially important Black Sea region. The significance of the Black Sea, which Romania con-
siders its backyard,35 is perceived not only in relation to Russia but also to the Middle
East. Of the Eastern flank nations, Romania and Bulgaria are the closest to the Middle
East. The Middle East, if Turkey is considered part of it, is therefore in their neighbour-
hood. The strategic position of Romania is important not only for the country itself, but
for its NATO allies as well. Especially for countries such as the US, it lies on the way to the
Middle East, as well as Afghanistan.36
Romania joined NATO in 2004, together with most of the other CEE states. Since 2013
it has been significantly increasing its defence expenditure, rising from 1.28% to 2.04% of
GDP in 2019. In the same year, the Romanian Armed Forces (RAF) had 73,100 active
duty servicemen. The main actors of Romanian foreign and security policy are the
Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As a semi-presidential system, the
President of the Republic can influence foreign policy, if he chooses to do so. There
have been even situations when the President abused power and was impeached for
it.37 The Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are each in
charge of different military units. Despite frequent political turmoil, the top priorities
of Romanian foreign policy have remained stable, such as being a credible ally in
NATO. The only exception is current President Klaus Iohannis, who has deviated some-
what from the Western direction of the country and has tried to take a more neutral
approach to Russia.38 In our analysis we scrutinise two main strategic documents. The
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first of them is the National Defence Strategy 2015-2019, which sets out the basic interests
and objectives of Romania, identifies threats, and describes the country’s security
environment. The second document is the Military Strategy of Romania from 2016,
where more precise steps and priorities for defence of the country are laid out. In
addition, we take into account the foreign policy objectives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and expert literature on this topic.
Strategic interest
The Romanian Defence Strategy from 2015 defines two levels of national interest, higher
and broader national security interests, followed by more specific national security objec-
tives. Both of these categories are built on a set of values and principles for national secur-
ity. The national security interests include the protection of state sovereignty, democratic
values and human rights. Interestingly, Romania connects defence of its territorial integ-
rity with the loyalty of citizens to the state and its institutions. “Ensuring the irreversible
nature of belonging to the trans-Atlantic collective defense systems” is one of the priori-
ties.39 Among the more specific national security objectives, the most relevant for this
analysis are: 1) “strengthening Romania’s profile within NATO and the EU, through con-
ceptual, as well as operational contributions; 2) consolidating the strategic partnership
with the US, including the economic and trade co-operation; 3) ensuring security in
the Black Sea region; 4) deepening co-operation with neighbouring states and states of
NATO’s Eastern flank; 5) promoting political, economic, and security interests in
regions strategically relevant for our country.”40 The security objectives imply that
NATO and the EU are crucial for protection of Romania’s national interests. The stra-
tegic partnership with the US is thus considered a security guarantee for the country.
This is not an unusual approach in Romanian foreign policy, which has traditionally
relied on the big players in the Black Sea region, at the expense of co-operation with
its neighbours.41 The need for strengthening its place in the western security systems
became even more acute after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and even more so after
the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Interests in the Middle East
The Middle East direction is quite vaguely mentioned in Romanian strategic documents,
as a region that directly and indirectly affects the country’s national interests,42 together
with North Africa. The strategic documents emphasise the importance of focusing on
both the Southern and Eastern dimensions. In the Military Strategy, developments in
the MENA region are mentioned as “a true paradigm shift in Romania’s area of strategic
interest.”43
Strategic credibility
The concept of strategic credibility resonates throughout the Romanian strategic docu-
ments as one of the main characteristics of its foreign policy. In other words, Romania
aims to be a predictable and credible ally.44 According to Gerasymchuk,45 this is a
rather new trend in Romanian strategic thinking. Romania is aware that the security
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interests of NATO members differ and is willing to accommodate this in exchange for a
security guarantee.46 By its involvement in the Middle East it aims to help bear the
burden of the Southern flank states and thereby strengthen their relationship.
Stabilisation of migration flows
Before the events of the Arab Spring in the early 2010s and ongoing destabilisation of the
Middle East, Romania had perceived terrorism and migration as threats existing only far
beyond its borders. However, the updated strategic documents note the deteriorating
security environment in the ME neighbourhood and the possibility of the influence of
these threats on its territory. The Defence Strategy describes the crises in the Middle
East, including terrorism, Islamic radicalisation, and intensified migration, as a challenge
to security.47 Migration especially threatens the stability of Europe as a whole, and con-
sequently also Romania. The migration crises, however, should primarily be managed by
the EU.48 Terrorism, according to the strategy, is not a directly threatening issue within
Romania, but the proximity of countries where it flourishes makes terrorism an external
threat.49
Restoration of historical relations with Middle Eastern countries
Romania has always had interests in the Middle East, especially during the communist
regime. The country had close relations with many Arab countries in the Middle East,
as well as with Iran. For instance, Romania helped install Iraqi infrastructure, with the
former Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana claiming that Romania had built one-third of
Iraq’s economy.50 Another example of pre-1989 cooperation is Lebanon, which used
to invest heavily in Romanian businesses. Romania considers Lebanon the “ideal
gateway to Middle East” to this day.51 However, after 1989 and the westernisation of
Romanian foreign policy, good economic and diplomatic relations with Arab states
have been almost entirely suspended. Post-communist Romania saw all its interests in
integration into Western organisations and the transition to a market economy.52
Since 2006 the country has been trying to restore its frozen relations with Middle
Eastern countries. Nonetheless, they still remain rather low-profile.53 Some voices
claim that Romania should follow up on its pre-1989 ME policy as soon as possible,
before the former links are completely forgotten by a new generation of Middle
Eastern politicians.54 Also, according to Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Teodor
Melescanu, the development of political and economic relations between Romania and
Arab states is a priority for Romanian foreign policy. In this regard, Romania should
aim to resolve disagreements through bilateral negotiations, in order to resolve crises
and bring stability and peace to the Middle East.55
Mediation between Israel and Turkey
As Turkish-Israeli relations have worsened, Romania has seen itself as a possible
mediator between the two countries, since it has excellent relations with both sides.
Turkey as a NATO member and Israel as a NATO partner are both strategically impor-
tant for the Alliance and for the United States in the Mediterranean and Middle East
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region. Romania could therefore serve as a middle ground in the Israel-Turkey-US secur-
ity triangle.56 On one hand Turkey represents a strategic partner, besides the US, with
which Romania co-operates on a high level. On the other hand, Romanian relations
with Israel were good even during the communist regime, when it was the only
country from the Eastern Bloc that had diplomatic relations with Israel between 1967
and 1989. Intergovernmental discussion and joint military exercises are common
among these countries.57 However, Romania proceeds carefully in the Palestinian ques-
tion since it does not want to undermine its efforts to build relations with other Arab
countries.58
Level of engagement
On the rhetorical level, Romanian representatives are strongly supportive of Romanian
involvement in NATO’s ME initiatives. The current Prime Minister Ludovic Orban
does not even oppose further engagement of NATO in the Middle East and says that
Romania should actively join in.59 Similarly, President Iohannis has expressed the
need to explore new ways for NATO to “become more involved in the region and in
the fight against terrorism.”60
Military engagement
According to its Military Strategy, Romania should participate in NATO collective
defence in several ways. The country should provide its capabilities to NATO and its stra-
tegic partnerships, participate in various initiatives and programmes of the Alliance, as
well as in operations abroad.61 Thanks to its strategic location, Romania can contribute
to allied missions and operations in Middle East and Asia by providing logistic support.
For instance, the Constanța air base helps to create an air bridge for transfer of NATO
personnel and equipment to and from Iraq and Afghanistan.62 In 2019, Romanian
Armed Forces (RAF) participated in foreign missions and operations with around
1,902 soldiers. The Ministry of Internal Affairs sent to these operations another 760 ser-
vicemen and police officers. It is mostly active within the mission in Afghanistan and the
Sea Guardian naval operation in the Mediterranean; in 2019 it deployed several hundred
soldiers to these operations.63
NATO Mission Iraq
Romania joined the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Iraq in 2016, in order to
support the fight of the US-led coalition against Daesh. Later in 2017, it extended the mis-
sion’s mandate to the territory of Kuwait and in 2019 to Qatar. About 50 soldiers and
police officers from both the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior were
deployed in OIR. The deployment within the NATO Mission Iraq is considerably
smaller. The mandate allowed for 18 military advisors to take part in the mission struc-
ture, and no Interior Ministry personnel.64 By the end of the year only fourteen soldiers
of the Romanian Armed Forces were present. The deployed soldiers are engaged in pro-
viding expertise at the Iraqi War College, advising the Iraqi Ministry of Defence with
military reforms and training Iraqi military instructors.65 Undoubtedly, it cannot be
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said that Romania shirks its duties. Given that the NMI is generally a smaller NATO
operation with about 580 personnel from all member states, the significance of each
member state’s contribution cannot be primarily deduced from the numbers of deployed
personnel to the mission. More clarity of how much importance is given by the state to
direct engagement in the NMI can be seen in the percentage of troops in the operation
out of the total number of troops deployed in foreign operations. Such a comparison
shows that Romania, which is otherwise quite active in operations beyond its borders,
participates with the lowest share in the NMI.
NATO Partnerships
The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made assistance to partner states one of its
objectives in NATO. Nonetheless, while the ministry has not prioritised its NATO part-
nerships, ongoing Romanian assistance to Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova strongly
suggests that its main focus is on the Eastern Partnership. Romania aims to help
strengthen the resilience and defence capabilities of its Middle East partners, as well as
support their counter-terrorist efforts.66 Romania sees the Mediterranean Dialogue part-
nership as a framework that connects different actors in the Mediterranean region with
NATO and helps them build mutual confidence. The country claims to support both
partnerships, both politically and practically,67 but this is not reflected in practice and
public communication on these topics is lacking. Within the Mediterranean Dialogue,
Romania has co-operated more actively with the countries of North Africa, particularly
Mauritania and Mali, than with countries in the Middle East region.
On one occasion, the Romanian Special Naval Forces helped to train and assist partner
states within NATO Mediterranean Dialogue.68 Another co-operation initiative started
in November 2019, when the first round of the “Romania-Egypt Defence Forum” took
place in Bucharest and the two countries proclaimed their will to co-operate in order
to manage the security situation in the Mediterranean.69 Another NATO Mediterranean
Dialogue partner country that Romania co-operates with is Jordan. For Romania it is
considered a “major NATO partner” in the region and a state that is affected by the
Syrian refugee crises. Therefore, Romania has decided to support Jordan with humani-
tarian aid, which in 2015 amounted 1 million lei (over 200,000 EUR).70 Romania also
participates in the Science for Peace and Security Programme, but it does not co-
Figure 1. Personnel in foreign operations and in NMI. Note: Romania counts personnel from the Min-
istry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior separately73.
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operate with ICI or Mediterranean Dialogue countries, except for Mauritania. Also,
Romania’s NATO Contact Point Embassies are more oriented towards the countries
around the Black Sea, where its main strategic interest lies. While Romania has several
diplomatic missions throughout the Middle East, only its embassy in Kuwait has
served as a NATO Contact Point for a two-year period since 2019.71 Kuwait is an
especially important part of the ICI partnership, since it hosts the ICI Regional Centre.
Conclusions
Our proposed conceptual framework enables a qualitative analysis of free riding along
two axes: strategic interest and level of engagement. According to this framework, a
high level of strategic interest but lack of corresponding engagement would denote a
free rider. In other words, free riding does not mean a definite lack of input; it is
merely a situation where a state’s level of engagement is lower than its interest.
A country that falls into this category has strong interests in the Middle East yet does
not act on them through engagement in NATO Middle East initiatives. There are two
possible explanations for this behaviour. First, the country might be a so-called free
rider, according to the theory of alliances.72 In line with this theory, small countries in
Alliances tend to free ride on the security provided by bigger countries, as their contri-
bution in absolute numbers does not have much real impact. The alternative explanation
is that the country prefers other multilateral frameworks or bilateral co-operation to
NATO and finds them more suitable for pursuing its interests in the Middle East. The
reality will most likely be a combination of these factors and Romania fits both criteria:
it has a relatively strong interest in the Middle East region, where it is trying to renew its
historical ties and limit migration to Europe. However, its low engagement in the NMI
and in NATO partnerships does not match its ambitions. Furthermore, for Romania
NATO is not the primary framework to promote its interest in the Middle East.
Instead, Romania is focusing on bilateral strategic partnerships with countries like
Turkey, and it would prefer the EU to step up more in the stabilisation of the region.
The level of Romanian strategic interest and engagement in NATO is reflected in its
approach to the Middle East within the organisation. The transactional character of the
country’s interest in the Middle East is particularly visible: Romania pays attention to the
issues of the NATO Southern flank in order to maintain the attention of the Alliance on
its own security concerns, referring to the basic principle of NATO collective defence. A
prominent element influencing the scope of any state’s interests and cooperation with
Middle Eastern countries is whether it had any previous historical links to the region.
During the Cold War, it was common for the states of the Eastern Bloc to co-operate
on some level with several Arab countries. While the regimes of the CEE countries
changed, many of the Middle Eastern regimes persisted, and CEE states such as
Romania see the possibility to renew these relations. Moreover, Romania, because of
its geographical position, interacted with the Middle East long before the twentieth
century, which also heightens its interests. In this regard, Romania is trying to balance
its relations with Israel and the Arab countries.
The need for stabilisation of the Middle East and achieving a sustainable equilibrium
there is one of the most prominent of Romanian interests. This is an almost entirely
threat-driven perspective since the Romanian government considers the instability of
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the Middle East as one of the main causes of the current threats to Europe. Among the
numerous security issues, mass migration from the region plays a dominant role.
Additionally, Romanian authorities are concerned with terrorism, extremism, and radi-
calisation in Europe via migration and diasporas. Romania is aware that while in general
these threats do not at the moment directly affect its territory, in the future they could.
Another concern is the potential destabilisation of NATO’s Southern flank caused by
these factors, which would consequently destabilise the whole Alliance. With regards
to how to handle the instability in the Middle East, Romania would prefer EU manage-
ment of these threats to the NATO framework.
Because Romania values the broader concept of strategic credibility, it considers par-
ticipation in NATO operations abroad as a necessary contribution to the Alliance. Yet,
while it participates in the NATO Mission Iraq, this activity is definitely sub-optimal
not only in the context of Romania’s other engagement as showed in Figure 1, but
also in view of its ambitious interests. The country expresses interest in becoming
more involved in the Middle East and renewing old ties with the region, but it does
not pursue many specific interests and is left with strategic credibility as the most impor-
tant. For instance, whereas it aspires to pursue economic interests in the Middle East, it is
still in the phase of trying to establish economic relations with ME countries and explore
the options that local markets offer without having yet made any palpable progress or
success in this regard.
These results show the significance of qualitative analysis that is not based solely on
economic indicators. Furthermore, our paper contributes to the theory development
by analysing the defence institution from the point of view of its architecture as a
vehicle of national interests. Romania as a NATO member which spends more than
the 2% target on defence cannot be labelled a free rider. However, we argue that even
if the country meets this criterion, it can free ride on the collective goods provided by
the Alliance in other less quantifiable areas of transatlantic co-operation, such as advan-
cing its interests in the Middle East. Free riding on the political level of interests, together
with scrutinising microeconomic indicators which show where the money is actually
spent, raises again the question of the validity of the popular 2% threshold as the main
criterion for assessing commitment to NATO.
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